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A RG EN TIN E REPU BLIC v .  AM ERADA H ESS 
-- U.S . ----. 109 S .Ct . 683, 10 2 L .Ed 2d 818 
23 Jan uary 1989 
A fe deral co urt doe s  not have j ur isdict ion over a fore ign sovere ign that attac ks a ne utral sh ip in inte rnat ional water s 
unle ss the cla im is w ith in the except ion s en umerate d by the Fore ign Sovere ign Imm un it ie s  Act . 
FAC TS: United Carriers, Inc. !United!, a Liberian corporation, 
chartered the oil tanker Hercules to Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corporation (Hess!, also a Liberian corporation, to transport 
crude oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Alaska to the Hess 
Refinery in the United States Virgin Islands. 
On May 25, 1982, after completing delivery to the Virgin 
Islands, Hercules began the return voyage to Alaska, her tanks 
empty except for her fuel. At this time, Great Britain and 
Argentina were at war over the Falkland Islands. 
To insure the safety of neutral shipping, the United States, on 
June 3, 1982, informed the two hostile nations of the location of 
all U nited States vessels and Liberian tankers owned by United 
States interests and traveling in the South Atlantic including 
the position of Hercules. Five days later, while in international 
waters, the Hercules was attacked by Argentine aircraft 600 
nautical miles from Argentina and 500 miles !rom the Falklands, 
well outside the war zone designated by both countries. 
The damaged Hercules headed toward Rio DeJaniero under 
her own power, where, upon arrival, the Brazilian Navy de­
termined that an undetonated bomb remamed lodged in the 
ship and, concluding it was too dangerous to remove it, scuttled 
the ship 250 miles off the coast of Brazil. 
United brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York seeking damages of� LO million 
dollars due to the loss of the ship. Hess sought damages of $1.9 
million dollars for its fuel. Jurisdiction was pr{'mised upon 
violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATSI, 28 l .S.C. �1350. 
which grants original jurisdiction to the district courts for tort 
actions by aliens who violate a treaty of the United States or the 
"'law of nations", as well as the general admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1333, and the ··principle of universal 
jurisdiction" undei� internationalla'Vv·. 
The district court held that both complaints were barred by the 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act t FSIA1 and therealter dis­
missed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 683 F.Supp. 
73 (S.D.N.Y. 1976!. The Second Circuit reverst·d, 830 F.2d 421 
12d Cir. 1987 I, ruling that the lower court has junsd1ction under 
the ATS because the action sounded in tort tship bombed with­
out justification! and violated international law 1 unJustilied 
and unprovoked in international waters). The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 
ISSU E: Whether the ATS, the general maritime jurisdiction 
of§ 1333 or the universal jurisdiction of international law grants 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign who attacks a neutral ship 
traveling in international waters engaged in United States 
domestic trade? 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 
U.S. C. §1604 is the sole basis for granting jurisdiction over a 
foreign sovereign under the above circumstances. The ATS is no 
longer applicable to jurisdiction. The text and structure of the 
FSIA demonstrates Congress' intention that a foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts in the United 
States except as provided in §§1605-1607 of the Act. The FSIA 
· must be applied by the district courtlsl in every action against 
a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any 
such action depends on the existence of one of the specified 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity." Verlinden B.V. v. 
Central Bank ofNigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 ( 1983>. 
The Second Circuit acknowledged the "general rule" that the 
Act governs the immunity of foreign states in federal court, 830 
F.2d at 426, but reasoned that the FSIA's commercial focus 
combined with Congress' failure to repeal the ATS indicated that 
Congress intended to allow federal courts to continue to exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign states in suits alleging violations of 
international law outside the confines of FSIA. 
The Supreme Court noted that the lack of pro tanto repeal by 
Congress of the ATS when the FSIA was passed in 1976 may be 
explained by the uncertainty as to whether the ATS conferred 
jurisdiction in suits against foreign states. Furthermore, the 
language of§ 1602 clearly states that "claims of foreign states to 
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United 
States in conformity with the principals set forth in this chapter" 
I emphasis added!. A reflection of Congress' intent, this language 
precludes jurisdiction premised on the ATS in the instant suit. The 
Court also noted that the FSIA statutory scheme is comprehensive; 
(Continued ... ) 
Ar gentine Rep ublic v. Amera da He ss (Cont.) 
the Court doubted that "even the most meticulous draftsman 
would have concluded that Congress also needed to amend pro 
tanto the Alien Tort Statute and presumably such other grants 
of subject matter jurisdiction in Title 28 .... " 
Congress provided for admiralty jurisdiction in federal court 
when it enacted the FSIA. Contained within the statute are 
exceptions to immunity, which include waiver, §1605 Ia); com­
mercial activities occurring within or directly affecting the United 
States, §1605 (a)(2); property expropriated in violation of inter­
national law §1605 (a)(3); certain property within the United 
States §1605 (a)(4); non-commercial torts occurring in the United 
States § 1605 laH5 ); and maritime liens against vessels and/or 
cargo §1605 lbl. But, due to the statute's comprehensive and 
preemptive nature, unless the case falls within one of the excep­
tions listed, the statute does not authorize the bringing of an 
action. The Court agreed with the district court that none of the 
exceptions applied. 
The Court's ruling establishes that the FSIA provides the sole 
basis for granting jurisdiction over a foreign state in United 
States courts and the district court correctly dismissed the action 
because the FSIA did not authorize jurisdiction over Argentina 
under the facts of this case. 
Patr ic ia M. D'Ora zio '90 
AND REW G. BLACK v. RED STA R TOWING & T RANSPO RTATION CO., INC .  v. MO BIL OIL CO RP. 
U nited S tate s Co urt of Appeal s, Secon d C irc uit, 17 October 1988 
860 F. 2d 30 (en ban e) 
A fter 60 year s, "The Fe deral No. 2" ha s little sa lva ge va lue .  A c la im a ga in st a th ir d  party for a proportionate share of 
maintenance an d c ure i s  nothin g  more than a claim for contr ib ut ion un der well- settle d a dmira lty pr inciple s. 
FACTS: On February 27, 1985, plaintiff, Andrew G. Black 
I Black) a marine engineer employed by Red Star Towing and 
Transportation Co., Inc. (Red Star! was responsible for arranging 
to purchase oil and transfer it to Red Star's tug Crudaser. While 
the tug was tied to a dock owned by Mobil Oil Corporation 
( Mobill, a deckhand placed a wooden ladder on the tug·s deck to 
facilitate access from the tug's deck to the pier above. Black, in 
the course of his employment, and discharging his responsibili­
ties, ascended and descended the ladder on several occasions. At 
the jury trial, Black testified that "the ladder . .. seemledl to be 
wobbly" because of high winds and choppy seas. 
Due to Black's concern with the wooden ladder, he began to use 
a steel ladder which was affixed to Mobil's dock. On Black's 
second descent, the left side of the ladder's rungs gave way 
causing Black to drop onto the broken rung, resulting in the 
broken rung becoming imbedded in his buttocks. Black 
sustained various injuries, including severe contusions of the 
sciatic nerve. 
The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and only the 
issues of liability and apportionment were presented to the jury 
in the trial court. The jury found Black 90°k liable, Mobil 109'c 
liable and O'k liability against Red Star. 
In the post-trial motion, Red Star sought indemnity from Mobil 
for the maintenance and cure paid to Black, plus attorney's fees 
in the defense of this action. The district court denied Red Star's 
motion recognizing the 60 year old doctrine of The Federal No.2, 
21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927) that "a shipowner is not entitled to 
indemnity for maintenance and cure from a negligent third party." 
With respect to that part of the motion for attorney's fees, the 
district court denied Red Star's application upon the failure to 
show any "vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct on the part 
of Mobil." In a summary order filed on December 4, 1987 by the 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, the district 
court's order was affirmed, and Red Star's alternate argument, 
based on a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike 
performance, was likewise rejected for lack of a substantial 
relationship between the parties. Red Star made application for 
a rehearing en bane for reconsideration. 
ISSU E: Does a shipowner have a right of indemnity against a 
third-party tortfeasor for maintenance and cure paid to an in­
jured seaman? 
ANALYSIS: In the United States Court of Appeals decision 
overruling The Federal No.2, the court reviewed the analysis 
between the social conditions which give rise for a parent to 
recover monetary damages for expenses incurred in connection 
with injuries sustained to her children, and the like doctrine for 
spousal recovery under similar circumstances, to that of a sea-
- 2-
man·s rights to maintenance and cure which arise under a 
contractual relationship between an employer and employee. 
Following this rationale, the court in The Federal No. 2 had 
denied recovery by a shipowner for expenses voluntarily paid to 
an injured seaman for maintenance and cure. This policy has 
been followed to insure the unqualified right of an injured 
seaman, to the prompt payment of maintenance and cure, with­
out delay of third-party actions. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil 
Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730 I 1943). This benefit did not preclude a 
seaman from recovering directly from the primary third-party 
tortfeasor for injuries sustained. However, when the seaman 
sued both the third-party and the shipowner jointly, the ship­
owner remained responsible for maintenance and cure to the 
extent of the third-party's failure to pay. SeeSeelyv. Cityo{New 
York, 24 F.2d 412 i2d Cir. 1930). 
In reviewing the handling of this issue in other circuits, this 
court examined the Third Circuit's application of state common 
Ia w in favor of the doctrine of indemnification and/or contribu­
tion by third parties under the theory that a seaman-shipowner 
relationship does give rise to a "social condition" deserving of 
the right of contribution. See Jones v. Waterman Steamship 
Corp. Inc., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946). The Fifth Circuit rejected 
the holding of The Federal No. 2, and held that an innocent 
shipowner was entitled to indemnification from a third-party 
tort-feasor for expenses incurred in the payment of maintenance 
and cure. See Savoie v. LaFourche Boat Rentals Inc., 627 F.2d 
722, 723 (5th Cir. 1980). 
The Ninth Circuit allowed third-party actions for indemnification 
based on the contractual relationship that existed between the 
shipowner and the third-party which gives rise to the implied 
warranty of workmanlike performance. See Ryan Stevedoring 
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In the 
instant matter, however, the court found that this single trans­
action did not give rise to a contractual relationship and there­
fore, Red Star's theory of a breach of the implied warranties did 
not apply. 
In reviewing the equity of an innocent shipowner bearing the 
full burden of maintenance and cure, the United States Court of 
Appeals concluded that a claim by a shipowner against a third­
party tortfeasor was little more than a "claim for contribution 
under well-settled admiralty principles." See Adams v. Texaco, 
Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1981). In balancing the equities, 
this court held that such claim for reimbursement could be 
brought by an independent action, a third-party action, or a 
cross-claim, but only to the extent of that third-party's proportion­
ate share of the damages. The court reversed and remanded this 
matter to the district court, with instruction to enter judgment 
in favor of Red Star in an amount equal to Mobil's proportionate 
share of the maintenance and cure paid by Red Star. 
Dorothy Phillips-Geller '91 
